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Article 1

SYMPOSIUM
Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the
Future of the Confrontation Clause in
Light of Its Past
INTRODUCTION
Robert M. Pitler †
On February 18th, 2005, the Brooklyn Law School Moot
Court Room was filled to capacity by some three hundred
people from across the country attending an all-day program,
“Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future of the
Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past.” The Crawford in
the title, of course, refers to the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Crawford v. Washington, 1 decided less than a year
earlier.
THE MAJORITY OPINION
Authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the seven-justice
Crawford majority opinion abandons the too “subjective” and
“unpredictable” 2 “indicia of reliability” framework of Ohio v.
Roberts, 3 which for nearly twenty-five years had governed
†
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librarians. © 2005 Robert M. Pitler.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Id. at 63.
3
448 U.S. 56 (1980). Under Roberts, a hearsay statement satisfies the
“indicia of reliability criteria” if, without more, it fits “within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception” or if the statement has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Id.
at 66. Roberts could easily be read to require a showing of declarant’s unavailability in
order to admit a hearsay statement against a criminal defendant. Id. at 65, 66
(“[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.”). See 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 252 at 123-24 (J. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). As the result
of the decisions in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) and White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 353-55 (1992) the Court moved away from or clarified the unavailability
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Confrontation Clause challenges to the admissibility of
nontestifying declarants’ hearsay statements at criminal trials.
The Crawford majority is dissatisfied with the indicia of
reliability framework because of its proven capacity for and
“unpardonable vice” of leading lower courts to admit the very
kind of uncross-examined hearsay statements of a
nontestifying declarant that the Confrontation Clause was
designed to exclude, such as prior trial testimony, grand jury
testimony, guilty plea colloquies, and custodial confessions of
accomplices. 4 According to Crawford, confrontation requires
cross-examination of a hearsay declarant, not a judicial inquiry
into the reliability of a hearsay statement. 5 As Justice Scalia
pithily puts it, “[d]ispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.” 6
In support of replacing the Roberts reliability
framework with a more categorical approach, Justice Scalia
describes the evil that the Confrontation Clause sought to
address.
According to Justice Scalia, that evil was the
admission of statements by nontestifying witnesses obtained
through ex parte examinations (some conducted by
These
considerably less benign methods than others). 7
requirement, apparently leaving untouched its application to prior testimony. Little, if
any, of the requirement was left, however, with respect to firmly-rooted hearsay
exceptions, which do not require a showing of unavailability, such as the twenty-three
in Federal Rule of Evidence 803. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation
Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 711 n.96.
4
541 U.S. at 63-65.
5
Id. at 61-62 (citations omitted).
6
Id. at 62.
7
Id. at 50. In at least four places, the Crawford majority points to Sir
Walter Raleigh’s 1603 treason trial as involving a prototypical confrontation violation.
See 541 U.S. at 44, 50, 52, 62. At his trial, Raleigh futilely demanded at least thrice
that his alleged co-conspirator and principal, if not only, accuser, Lord Cobham, appear
at trial, face Raleigh, and repeat his out-of-court, ex parte-examination statement, as
well as the contents of a letter Cobham had written to Raleigh. See The Trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh, in 2 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO
THE PRESENT TIME 1, 15-16, 23 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816) [hereinafter HOW. ST. TR.]. It is
likely that torture or threats of torture were used to secure oral or written statements
of other witnesses against Raleigh. See, e.g., id. at 19, 22 (Privy Council commissioner
Lord Howard acknowledging that a witness had been told that he deserved the rack,
but that this was not a threat; and another commissioner, Sir Wade, acknowledging
having “taught” a conspirator “his lesson” during an examination); see also, JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 325 (London,
Macmillan 1883) (stating that suspects and accomplices in Privy Council cases were
tortured). The record is silent as to the torture, if any, of Cobham. It appears that
Cobham turned against Raleigh when shown a letter that Raleigh had sent to Lord
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examinations were conducted under the “civil-law mode of
criminal procedure” 8 as practiced by justices of the peace,
magistrates, and other officers of the crown in sixteenth,
seventeenth and, perhaps, early eighteenth century England,
and in the American colonies, as well. 9
Marshalling English common law and early American
authority, Justice Scalia seeks to demonstrate that toward the
end of the seventeenth century, and certainly no later than the
middle of the eighteenth century, confrontation/crossexamination requirements with respect to ex parte
examinations had taken hold in both the mother country 10 and
the colonies (soon to declare themselves independent states). 11
Cecil, who was a moving force in the prosecution of Raleigh. See 1 DAVID JARDINE,
HISTORICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 436 (1832). In addition to the Crawford majority, many
have observed that the Raleigh case is a forebearer of the Confrontation Clause. See,
e.g., Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 711, 712 (1971) (stating that Raleigh’s trial was the “historical origin” of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause). Others have been more doubtful. See, e.g., Mural
A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67, 70 (1969).
An informed close observer has described the relationship between the Raleigh trial
and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as “a convenient, but highly romantic
myth.” See Kenneth W. Graham Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule:
Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100 n.4 (1972).
The trial itself, however, is real, and its influence on the Framers well
within the realm of possibility, as events of that kind can sear ideas into the political
consciousness and then they are passed on from generation to generation. Cf. 5 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 at 24 (3d ed. 1940). Compare The Trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh, 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 15 (after rejection of his demands that Lord Cobham
be brought to trial and accuse him to his face, Raleigh reportedly replied that he was
being tried “by the Spanish Inquisition”), with 2 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 110-11 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) (At the 1788 Massachusetts
convention to decide whether to ratify the Federal Constitution, delegate Abraham
Holmes objected to the omission of a constitutional provision detailing the mode of trial
including “whether [a defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and have
the advantage of cross-examination . . . .” As a result, Mr. Holmes argued that, in the
future, it will be revealed that Congress has the power to create judicial procedures
“little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain . . . the Inquisition.”). See
generally 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 6344-48 at 346-794 [hereinafter WRIGHT & GRAHAM] (a
thorough, interesting, and imaginative directed exploration of the English, American
colonial and preratification background of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause).
8
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
9
Id. at 43-44, 47-48.
10
Id. at 48-50 (citing 1776-83 declarations of rights issued by the recently
self-declared independent states, the state ratifying conventions and early American
cases following ratification of the Bill of Rights).
11
541 U.S. at 47. To establish Crawford’s continuity with much older
vintage decisions, Justice Scalia concludes that “nothing in [nineteenth century] cases
contradicts our holding in any way . . . . If nothing else, the test we announce is an
empirically accurate explanation of the results our cases reached.” Id. at 59 n.9. With
respect to the outcomes of more recent decisions, Justice Scalia also explains that they
“hew[ed] closely to the traditional [testimonial] line and have thus remained faithful to
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Given this history, Crawford concludes that a defendant’s right
to confrontation is violated by admission in evidence of presentday “testimonial statements” obtained by practices “with
closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed.” 12
Left for another day is “a comprehensive definition of
‘testimonial.’” 13 Still, the opinion expressly states that, at a
the Framers’ understanding.” Id. at 58-59. In a footnote, Justice Scalia acknowledges
that White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, discussed infra note 23, arguably is in tension with
the approach in Crawford. 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. Nonetheless, he explains that the Court
in White “had [taken] as a given” that the statements in issue fell within the relevant
hearsay exceptions, i.e., excited utterances and statements for the purpose of medical
diagnosis and treatment, and White only required the Court to decide whether there
was a constitutional unavailability requirement for statements coming within those
exceptions. 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 348-49, 351 n.4).
More notably and most curiously, albeit explicable, is the omission of Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), from recent cases described by Justice Scalia as
“hew[ing] the traditional [testimonial] line.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. It seems
unlikely that Wright was simply overlooked given that Chief Justice Rehnquist
expressly and solely relied on it as the basis for concluding that Crawford’s wife’s
statements were not clothed with the then Roberts-required particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. 541 U.S. at 76. In Wright, the Supreme Court upheld the Idaho
Supreme Court’s decision that the Confrontation Clause had been violated by
admitting into evidence, under a state residual exception to the hearsay rule, the
statements of a nontestifying two-and-a-half-year-old child sex abuse victim made in
response to suggestive questions by a doctor because the statements did not possess the
Roberts-required particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See Wright, 497 U.S. at
820-24.
The facts of record in Wright certainly would have made it fair to infer that
the doctor posing suggestive questions was doing so at the behest of the police. See
Margaret Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal
for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 603-04 (1992) [hereinafter,
Berger, Prosecutorial Restraint]; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, 2003 WL
22705281, at *7-8, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410) (counsel for petitioner states
that the doctor was acting in cooperation with the police). Also, it was undisputed that
the child had spent the night before the interview in police custody. Wright, 497 U.S.
at 809. As a result, the little girl’s statements could have certainly been viewed as
testimonial and their exclusion would have been faithful to the Framers’ testimonial
understanding. The problem, however, is that there is nary a word in the Wright
opinion that the doctor was a police agent. See Randolph Jonakait, Commentary: A
Response to Professor Berger; The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on
Government. 76 MINN. L. REV. 615, 618-19 (1992). Nor is there any suggestion that the
two-and-a-half-year-old victim in Wright knew or understood the significance of
making statements to the “police” even though she had spent the night before at the
stationhouse. 497 U.S. at 825-27. So viewed, the exclusion of the nontestifying child’s
nontestimonial statement could not be seen as “hew[ing] the traditional [testimonial]
line” unless the Confrontation Clause required cross-examination of nontestimonial
statements (i.e. the child to the doctor), a result probably not favored by Justice Scalia.
See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J. concurring); White, 502 U.S. at
364-66 (Thomas, J. concurring, joined by Scalia, J.). Perhaps this explains the
omission of Wright from the Crawford majority opinion.
12
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
13
Id. Without choosing among them, the Crawford majority mentions at
least three different formulations of the core class of testimonial statements: “ex parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent – that is, material such as affidavits,
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minimum, the testimonial category includes prior testimony at
a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial,
and statements made during “police interrogation.” 14 These
statements are admissible only if the declarant is unavailable
to testify at trial 15 and the defendant had the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant when he or she made the
statement, 16 or if the declarant “appears for cross-examination”
during the trial at which the statement is offered. 17 Also, as
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially” . . . “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions” . . . and “statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.” Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted). According to the majority,
these formulations share a common nucleus and the majority defines the
“[Confrontation] Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstractions around [the
nucleus].” Id. at 52. The abstraction, however, ought to be read in light of other
confrontation principles articulated by the majority. For example, the manner in
which the particular statements have been obtained should bear close kinship to the
abuses that gave rise to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 68. In addition, any
testimonial formulation should take account of Crawford’s emphasis on involvement of
governmental officers in producing testimonial evidence. See 541 U.S. at 53, 56 n.7.
14
Id. The majority characterizes guilty plea colloquy statements as “plainly
testimonial.” Id. at 64-65. Curiously, however, plea colloquy statements are not
included within the enumerated types of statements that, at a minimum, comprise the
testimonial category, set forth at the end of the opinion. See id. at 68. After Crawford,
without referring to this omission, courts have encountered no difficulty concluding
that plea colloquy statements are testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 377
F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004); People v. Hardy, 824 N.E.2d 953, 957 (N.Y. 2005). To the
extent that a guilty plea has an existence independent of the allocution it, too, has been
held to be testimonial. See United States v. Massino, 319 F. Supp. 2d 295, 298-99
(E.D.N.Y. 2004). More than 100 years before Crawford, a judgment of conviction of one
person offered as evidence against another person had been held to violate the
Confrontation Clause. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). It is not selfevident why a judgment is testimonial, although it is hearsay in need of an exception.
The federal hearsay exception for previous convictions incorporates the Kirby principle.
See FED. R. EVID. 803 (22).
15
The Crawford decision does not impact the principles governing the
meaning of unavailability, in particular those requiring reasonable good faith
prosecutorial efforts to secure the presence of the declarant to testify. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73-77 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 209-12 (1972);
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
16
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
17
Id. at 60 n.9 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)) (finding
no confrontation violation occasioned by the introduction of the witness’ prior crossexamined preliminary hearing testimony that was inconsistent with that witness’ trial
testimony); see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1988) (emphasizing
that the Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective crossexamination; thus, there was no violation of the confrontation right by the introduction
of the memory-challenged witness-victim’s out-of-court photographic identification of
defendant because the victim had testified under oath and responded willingly on
cross-examination, enabling defense counsel to elicit relevant information from the
victim, such as his bad memory); see generally Mosteller, supra note 3, at 724-36.
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the majority makes crystal clear, the Confrontation Clause
does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes
other than proving the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement. 18
Sprinkled throughout the majority opinion are little
confrontation bits and not-so-little confrontation morsels.
These bits and morsels describe characteristics of testimonial
and nontestimonial statements, as well as other significant
factors that will affect admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause.
The Court leaves no doubt that statements made in
response to police interrogation can be testimonial since those
interrogations “bear a striking resemblance to examinations by
Justices of the Peace in England.” 19 Although the majority
opinion recognizes, as it does with “testimonial,” 20 that there
can be several different definitions of “interrogations,” it
refrains from choosing one. 21 Rather, the Court simply states
that the custodial statement of Crawford’s wife Sylvia, which
was knowingly given in response to structured police
questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition of
interrogation. 22
Thus, the testimonial police-interrogation subcategory
includes accomplice and co-conspirator statements knowingly
made to the police during structured custodial questioning, 23

18
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 41314 (1985)) (no confrontation violation by the introduction of accomplice’s confession,
which had been introduced to rebut defendant’s claim that his own confession was a
sheriff-coerced copy of that of the accomplice, not for the truth of the facts asserted in
it. The only issues were what the accomplice said and what the sheriff did. Both of
those questions could be addressed by cross-examining the trial-testifying sheriff who
had first-hand knowledge of what had been said and done.).
19
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
20
See 541 U.S. at 68; see supra note 13.
21
541 U.S. at 53 n.4. The majority does state that it is using interrogation in
its “colloquial, rather than its technical legal sense” with a cf. citation to Rhode Island
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. At the cited pages,
the Innis Court defined interrogation for Miranda purposes to include express
questioning or its functional equivalent, i.e., “any words or actions on the part of the
police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. Despite this language, Innis says that the
standard is an objective one, focusing on the perspective of the defendant, although the
intent of the police may, in some limited circumstances, be relevant. See id.
22
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
23
See id. at 40, 41, 65 (noting that Crawford’s wife may have facilitated the
stabbing and that she herself was a suspect); id. at 56, 58, (citing with approval Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999) (plurality opinion) (all nine justices seemingly
agreed that the introduction of an accomplice’s stationhouse confession to the police
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and perhaps noncustodial, structured questioning as well.
Though not expressly recognized by the Crawford majority,
statements of informants may be testimonial. Informant
statements can be so characterized because they were part and
parcel of the civil law mode of ex parte examination in the
prosecution of smuggling cases in the Vice Admiralty courts in
America, to which the majority made express reference. 24
Witnesses’ statements, including those of young
children, may also be testimonial when made in knowing
response to structured police questioning, as the text of a
Crawford footnote clearly implies, albeit in dicta. 25 A witness’
statement may be testimonial even if it fits within a modernday exception to the hearsay rule, e.g., an excited utterance. 26
The majority opinion, however, cannot be read to say that
every police question is an interrogation; nor is every answer
testimonial.
A common thread running throughout the majority
opinion is concern with government-created (elicited)
testimony. As stated by the majority opinion: “[I]nvolvement
can violate the Confrontation Clause)). See also supra note 21 (suggesting that express
questioning is not required).
24
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48 (testimony was routinely taken by deposition
or private judicial examination). As for the use of informants in American Vice
Admiralty courts, see, for example, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6345 at 489,
502, 503 n.506, 504 n.509, 536-41. The manner of Admiralty prosecution and
enforcement was a major, if not obsessive, concern of the colonists-turnedrevolutionists. See id. § 6345 at 483-540.
25
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (describing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
349-51 (1992) as arguably in tension with a rule requiring a prior opportunity for crossexamination in order to introduce a testimonial statement of a nontestifying witness).
The statement in White v. Illinois was that of an allegedly sexually abused four-yearold girl made during a police interview at her home some fifty minutes after the alleged
abuse. See People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1243-46 (Ill. App. 1990) (Under Illinois
law, the four-year-old’s statement was admissible as a spontaneous statement because
it related to a startling event and it was made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by that event.). To Justice Scalia, “[i]t is questionable whether
testimonial statements would even have been admissible on that ground in 1791; to the
extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations existed at all, it required
that the statements be made ‘immediately upon the hurt received, and before the
declarant had time to devise or contrive anything for her own advantage.’” Crawford,
541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (quoting Thompson v. Trevanion, (1694) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.)).
Though somewhat ambiguous, footnote 8 certainly implies that a statement like the
one involved in the 1694 case either would be a historical exception to confrontation or
nontestimonial in nature because, under the circumstances, the declarant was not
bearing testimony. Put another way, a 1694-like spontaneous res gestae non-narrative
statement is not akin to the ex parte examination evils at which the confrontation right
is directed. A modern day excited utterance, not made contemporaneously with the
exciting event but a narrative of it in response to structured police questioning, may
arguably be a next of kin.
26
See 541 U.S. at 58 n.8, discussed supra note 25.
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of government officers in the production of testimony with an
eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial
abuse – a fact borne out time and again throughout a history
with which the Framers were keenly familiar.” 27
The majority acknowledges that “an accuser who makes
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a
sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.” 28 Giving as an example “[a]n off-hand,
27

Id. at 56 n.7.
See id. at 51. “Imagine and consider if you will,” Rod Serling, The Twilight
Zone (CBS television broadcast 1959-1964), the 1603 treason prosecution of Sir Walter
Raleigh for conspiring, inter alia, to overthrow James I and replace him with a female
cousin, to bring Roman Catholicism to England, and to have foreign powers invade the
country, all to be financed by the King of Spain and the Archduke of Austria. See 2
HOW. ST. TR. at 1-3. At the trial, a prosecution witness, one Dyer, a pilot, testified in
person (apparently the only one to do so) that:
I came to a merchant’s house in Lisbon, to see a boy that I had there; there
came a gentleman into the house, and enquiring what countryman I was, I
said, an Englishman. Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned?
And I answered, No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly. Nay, saith he,
he shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh and Don Cobham will cut his
throat ere that day come.
Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25.
In one reported version of the trial, Raleigh responded by stating, “What
infer you upon this?” 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25. In a later version, Raleigh reportedly said,
“This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggerly Priest; but what proof is it against
me?” JARDINE, supra note 7, at 436. The Attorney General (Sir Edward Coke) replied
to Raleigh, “That your treason hath wings.” Id. at 436; see also 2 HOW ST. TR., supra
note 7, at 25 (“That your treason had wings.”). The first edition of State Trial Reports
was published in 1719 and several editions followed. See 12 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127-30 (2d ed. 1938); see also JARDINE, supra note 7, at
400.
Jardine explains that his 1824 edition relies on previously unavailable
manuscripts. Id. Perhaps it is an overly-suspicious nature, but this later edition
seems to be written in a more modern style than the earlier versions, and that raises
questions. But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6342 at 261 n.559 (agreeing
with Jardine that the manuscript upon which he relies “is the most accurate and
complete”).
Unlike his demand to be accused to his face by Lord Cobham, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text, Raleigh made no similar demand with respect to the
pilot Dyer. Perhaps by Raleigh’s rhetorical inquiry with respect to Dyer’s testimony,
“what infer you by this?”, id. at 25, he was simply arguing the absence of probative
value or a hearsay point because the gentleman’s statement to Dyer was “no evidence.”
See 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 20 (where Raleigh made other hearsay points); JARDINE, supra
note 7, at 429 (another hearsay point). Could it be that in 1603, prescient Sir Walter
recognized the difference between the hearsay of an unavailable private person’s outof-court statement offered for its truth by the prosecution, and the offer by the
prosecution of government secured, ex parte-examined statements and letters of an
available coconspirator? Finally, Attorney General Coke, was up to Raleigh’s hearsay
challenge, if that it be, and in effect responded that the out-of-court statement of the
gentleman in Portugal was offered not for its truth, but only that it had been said in
Portugal, and thus the conspiracy was an active one. See 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 25. Upon
conviction, Raleigh was sentenced to death; he spent the next fourteen years in the
Tower of London, writing a History of the World and dabbling with chemistry.
Subsequently, the King temporarily paroled him and sent him on a mission to mine
gold in Guyana, incurring the wrath of the Spanish. The quest failed and, upon his
28
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overheard remark” that might be unreliable evidence, and thus
a good candidate for exclusion under the hearsay rule, the
majority opinion expressly states that not all hearsay
implicates the Confrontation Clause. 29 Such an off-handed
remark, notes the majority, bears little resemblance to the
civil-law abuses targeted by the Confrontation Clause. 30
The Court also mentions some common hearsay
statements that would not be testimonial. The majority
opinion goes out of its way to expressly state that both business
records and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are not
testimonial. 31 A private individual’s statement to another
return to England, Raleigh was executed. See 2 HOW. ST. TR. at 31-33; JARDINE, supra
note 7, at 476-79.
29
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 56; accord id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, the
Chief Justice gave the majority credit for excluding from the testimonial category
business and “official” records. Id. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority,
however, mentions only business records. Id. at 56. This divergence in views leaves
open the extent to which public records, in particular law enforcement reports and
records, are nontestimonial. Like the business records of private enterprise, many
public records and reports, including those of law enforcement, seem far removed from
the evil civil-law ex parte examinations that lie at the core of Crawford. Interestingly,
in 1974, relying on “confrontation concerns” about adversarial information contained in
police reports expressed by members of the House of Representatives, see 120 CONG.
REC. 2387-88 (remarks of Reps. Brasco, Dennis, Holtzman, Hunt Johnson, & Smith); S.
REP. NO. 93-1277, at 17 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7064, the
Congress amended Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B) to exclude as hearsay
certain law enforcement reports and records sought to be introduced as a public record
in criminal cases. FED. R. EVID. 803(8); see H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 11 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7104-05 (adopting the above-mentioned
amendment). The potential breadth of this exclusion has been limited by federal
decisions holding that the prohibition does not encompass routine, non-adversarial law
enforcement reports when they do not involve a subjective investigation and evaluation
of crime. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66-84 (2d Cir. 1977) (under Rule
803(8)(B) & (C), error to admit a Customs Service chemist’s work sheets and report
concluding that the white powdery substance analyzed was heroin). Moreover, the
confrontation policy reflected by Rule 803’s special treatment of law enforcement
reports, “applies with equal force to . . . any of the other exceptions to the hearsay rule.”
Id. at 78. Cf., e.g., United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 911-12 (11th Cir. 1993)
(Although Rule 803(6) cannot be used as a back door to admit evidence excluded under
Rule 803(8)(B), a police property clerk receipt for a weapon is a business record within
the meaning of Rule 803(6) and its admission does not run afoul of the Rule 803(8)
exclusion for law enforcement reports because the police custodian, as part of his
routine-everyday function, prepared the property receipt with no incentive to do
anything other than mechanically record unambiguous information on that receipt.);
United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (the Rule 803(8)(B)
exclusion of matters observed by law enforcement personnel was not intended to
exclude records of routine non-adversarial matters such as these here – customs
officials recording and entering in a computer the license plate numbers of every
vehicle passing the border at a particular location, and the computer searching its
memory to determine whether a license number has appeared within the previous
seventy-two hours).
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private party would appear to be nontestimonial, 32 as would
statements unknowingly made to government officers,
including informants. 33
The majority coyly implies that a testimonial dying
declaration (one made to a government law enforcement officer)
may be a sui generis historical exception to the crossexamination requirement because of its recognition at common
law. 34 The opinion also expresses “acceptance” of a yet-to-bedefined rule of forfeiture of a confrontation objection to a
hearsay statement. This rule “extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds.” 35 Those grounds are
32

541 U.S. at 57 (citing with approval Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81, 8789 (1970) (considering reliability factors beyond a prior opportunity for crossexamination and rejecting a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission against
defendant of a co-conspirator’s statement to a fellow inmate under a unique Georgia
exception to the hearsay rule for statements during the concealment stage of the
conspiracy)).
33
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (citing with approval Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987)) (describing Bourjaily as “admitt[ing] statements made
unwittingly to a Federal Bureau of Investigation informant after applying a more
general test that did not make prior cross-examination an indispensable requirement”).
34
Id. at 56 n.6. To date, the highest state courts in California and Minnesota
have recognized dying declarations as a sui generis historical exception to confrontation
right. See People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004); State v. Martin, 695
N.W.2d 578, 585 (Minn. 2005). Contra United States v. Jordan, No. 04-CR-229-B, 2005
WL 513501, at *3 (D. Colo.) (unpublished opinion). Rather than an exception to
testimonial categorical exclusion, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that
introduction of a dying declaration does not violate confrontation because the accused
forfeited that right by killing the victim. See State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan.
2004).
35
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing with approval Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879) (“The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at
which he should be confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is
absent by [the accused’s] wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent
evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away.”)). The
Court’s acceptance of forfeiture notwithstanding, open issues remain. For example,
identifying the burden of proof governing the determination of whether the defendant
is responsible for the declarant’s failure to testify, compare, e.g., People v. Geraci, 649
N.E.2d 817, 821 (N.Y. 1995) (clear and convincing evidence is the standard), with 1997
Adv. Comm Note to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) in Preface to 117 S.Ct. 118 (the usual FED.
R. EVID. 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard applies to misconduct issues).
Another issue is whether the defendant must act with the purpose of preventing the
declarant from testifying, compare People v. Maher, 677 N.E.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. 1997)
(defendant’s conduct must be for the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying),
and United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1278-79 (1st Cir. 1996) (intent to prevent
witness need not be sole motivation), and cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (hearsay exception
for statements made by an unavailable declarant offered against a party who
intentionally engaged in or acquiesced in wrongdoing that rendered the declarant
unavailable), with State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 792-94 (Kan. 2004) (requiring no intent
to prevent witness from testifying), and United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364,
370 (6th Cir. 2005) (same) (even though FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) may require an intent
to prevent a witness from testifying, the confrontation right does not turn on “vagaries
of the rules of evidence,” (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61)). Additionally, there is the
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present when a declarant is wrongfully prevented from
testifying by conduct attributed to the defendant.
The majority muses and teases about nontestimonial
statements: “Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is
wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the states
flexibility in their development of hearsay law – as does
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” 36
The majority refrains, however, from deciding whether there is
any confrontation right or other constitutional protection
regarding nontestimonial statements. 37
Consequently, and finally, Ohio v. Roberts is never
expressly overruled in Crawford, although its indicia of
reliability framework no longer governs testimonial
statements. Presumably, since Roberts has not been overruled,
indicia of reliability is still the benchmark for nontestimonial
hearsay statements, at least until the Court decides
otherwise. 38
THE CONCURRING OPINION
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor,
concurred in the result reached by the Crawford majority. The
Chief Justice viewed the majority’s exclusion for a yet-to-bedefined category of testimonial statements as unnecessarily

question of whether the forfeiture will result in admission of the rankest sort of
hearsay as well as multiple levels of it, see, e.g., United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at
1283; United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. White,
838 F. Supp 618, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff’d, 116 F.3d 903, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Finally, even if federal confrontation forfeiture principles encompass the least
demanding of the above and other relevant forfeiture principles, there remains for
resolution the more demanding forfeiture hearsay requirements, if any, peculiar to
each state and the federal jurisdiction.
36
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; see also id. at 53 (“[E]ven if the Sixth
Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary
object . . . .”).
37
Id. at 68. In White v. Illinois, the Court rejected an argument to limit
Roberts and apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial statements, 502 U.S.
346, 352-53 (1992), thereby leaving remaining hearsay statements to regulation by
federal and state evidentiary principles. Instead, the Court held that the scope of the
confrontation protection encompassed both kinds of statements if they failed to meet
the Roberts requirements. See id. at 353-54. The Crawford majority notes that its
analysis casts doubt upon the White holding, but otherwise leaves the issue be. 541
U.S. at 61.
38
See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied 126 S. Ct. 375 (2005); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179 n.7 (3d Cir.
2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied 125 S. Ct.
938 (2005).
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bringing major uncertainty to the everyday prosecution of
criminal cases. 39 To the Chief Justice, the well-established
Roberts indicia of reliability framework was well up to the task
of resolving the confrontation-hearsay issue presented in
Crawford, and presumably those arising in the future as well.
Applying Roberts and its progeny to the custodial statements of
Crawford’s wife to the police – the crux of the Crawford case –
the concurring Justices had no difficulty in determining that
her statements failed to possess adequate indicia of reliability,
thus reaching the same result as the majority. 40
Turning to the same English and American sources
relied upon by the majority, the Chief Justice, in his concurring
opinion, concluded that the Scalian distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements “is no better rooted
in history than our current [Roberts] doctrine.” 41 Indeed, the
Chief Justice thought it an “odd conclusion . . . to think that the
Framers created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the
admissibility [of this newly-minted category of] testimonial
statements when the law during their own time was not fully
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist remained
settled.” 42
unconvinced “that the Confrontation Clause categorically
requires the exclusion of testimonial statements.” 43
THE REACTION
Immediately, Crawford was editorially celebrated as
“present[ing] an attractive vision of a Sixth Amendment that
rigorously lives up to the rights it promises.” 44 Crawford’s lead

39
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76 (“The Court grandly declares that ‘[w]e leave
for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial”’ . . . .
But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors
need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of ‘testimony’ the Court lists . . . is
covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months or years from now. Rules of
criminal evidence are applied every day in courts throughout the country, and parties
should not be left in the dark in this manner.” (citations omitted)). Justice Scalia
acknowledges the Chief Justice’s objection, characterizing it as a concern “that the
[majority’s] refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition [of testimonial] will cause
interim uncertainty.” Id. at 68 n.10. Justice Scalia continues: “But it can hardly be
any worse than the status quo [Roberts]. The difference is that the Roberts test is
inherently, and therefore permanently, unpredictable.” Id. (emphasis in original).
40
Id. at 76.
41
Id. at 69.
42
Id. at 73.
43
Id. at 72.
44
Editorial, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A30. Although welcoming
Crawford, the editorial cautions that the Court “will have to take care to ensure that
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attorney in the Supreme Court stated that the “decision will
fundamentally alter the way that criminal defendants are
tried . . . . No more will government be able to convict people of
crimes on the basis of accusations that they are unable to crossexamine.” 45 The second seat attorney in the Supreme Court in
Crawford, a leading confrontation scholar, wrote that Crawford
“radically transformed” 46 confrontation doctrine; to the news
media he called it a “wonderful development . . . the court is
saying . . . that the confrontation clause means what it says.” 47
Another law professor predicted “the question of what
constitutes testimonial statements would plague lower courts
and the attorneys in them on a case by case basis for years to
come.” 48
One New York criminal defense attorney called the
consequences of Crawford “awesome, [although] how it took so
long to get a decision like this is beyond belief.” 49 A Bronx
public defender observed:
“Mercifully the U.S. Supreme
Court . . . just made life in the domestic violence courts a lot
more pleasant for both defendants and public defenders.” 50
In contrast, a New York prosecutor mourned that
Crawford “‘may be the most significant criminal law decision
from the Supreme Court in years . . . . [The Court has] thrown
out 30 years of analysis.’” 51 A second prosecutor observed that
in light of Crawford, “‘some prosecutors are slashing their
wrists because of the concern that statements are now going to
these rules do not become a straitjacket for the federal courts in terrorism trials that
already present a profound challenge.” Id.
45
Charles Lane, Justices Rule Against Statements Made Out of Court, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 2004, at A8 (quoting Jeffrey L. Fisher).
46
Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 5. In a side bar to
this article, a member of the Criminal Justice editorial board calls Crawford a “‘oneeighty’ . . . a tornado cutting a swath of uncertainty in the criminal justice community.”
Id. at 5.
47
Linda Greenhouse, Court Alters Rule on Statements of Unavailable
Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A21 (quoting Richard Friedman).
48
David Ziemer, U.S. Supreme Court Term Left Many Unanswered
Questions, DAILY RECORD, Oct. 18, 2004 (quoting the remarks of Charles Whitebread at
the Annual Public Defenders Conference in Milwaukee).
49
Tom Perrotta, The Struggle to Define ‘Testimony’ After ‘Crawford’, N.Y.L.J.,
June 21, 2004, at 1 (quoting Mark R. Baker).
50
David Feige, Domestic Silence: The Supreme Court Kills Evidence-Based
Prosecutions, SLATE, Mar. 12, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2097041 (“So from now on,
when the complainant in a domestic violence case insists she’s not coming to court and
just wants to drop the charges, I’ll just smile as the judge . . . says ‘case dismissed.’”).
51
Id. (quoting Assistant District Attorney Anthony Girese, Counsel to the
Bronx District Attorney).
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be excluded when in fact they . . . are now admissible under
statutes without any impediments imposed by the Sixth
Amendment.’” 52 A third, somewhat more sanguine, federal
prosecutor described Crawford as a “‘major restructuring of the
way the Confrontation Clause is interpreted . . . [a]nd . . . a
minor win for defendants.’” 53
Almost overnight, Crawford spawned an entire cottage
industry, including several hundred reported cases, well over
100 articles, an on-line blog, an on-line outline, an untold
number of casebooks and text supplements, conferences, CLE
lectures and presentations at prosecutorial and criminal
defense training sessions.
THE CONFERENCE AND THIS SYMPOSIUM
“Crawford and Beyond,” the first major academic
conference to address Crawford, sought to explore the thirtyone page discursive, sprawling and heavily footnoted, dictaladen Crawford majority opinion, which raises substantially
more questions than it answers. 54 The program was divided
52

Leonard Post, Prosecutors Feel Broad Wake of ‘Crawford’; Child Abuse
Cases, 911 Calls Affected, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 13, 2004, at 1 (quoting Richard Wintory,
Deputy County Attorney, Pima, Arizona and Vice-President for Deputy Prosecutors of
The National District Attorney’s Association).
53
See Perrotta, supra note 49, at 1 (quoting Daniel R. Alonso, Chief of the
Criminal Division, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New
York).
54
Some thirty-eight years before Crawford, an equally discursive, sprawling,
heavily footnoted, dicta-laden Supreme Court opinion, raising as many, if not more
questions than it answered, also dealing with everyday issues in criminal prosecutions,
demanded the attention of academics as well as police prosecutors, defense counsel and
trial and appellate judges. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996). Miranda and
the Fifth Amendment and Crawford and the Sixth Amendment have much more in
common than a similar opinion style. To mention but a few, they share a common law
history involving governmental ex parte examinations by interrogators of the same ilk.
The minority view in each case concluded that the majority misconstrued and rewrote
history. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 526 (White, J., dissenting; joined by Harlan &
Stewart, J.J.); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring; joined by O’Connor,
J.). The text of each amendment contains the word “witness,” which, in large part,
determines the scope of protection afforded by each. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. Both Miranda and Crawford rejected a twenty-five or more yearold standard as too malleable, and as having had the unpardonable vice of leading
lower courts to admit the very evidence sought to be excluded by the respective
amendments. The minority view in each case viewed the existing framework as more
than adequate to address the admissibility of the statements at issue. See Miranda,
384 U.S. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting; joined by Stewart & White, J.J.); Crawford, 541
U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Each case involves police interrogation and the
statements derived from it.
To Justice Scalia, Miranda is the antithesis of sound constitutional
decision-making, in large part because it leads to exclusion of statements that have not
been compelled, and thus do not violate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
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into four sessions. This Symposium issue of the Brooklyn Law
Review is devoted to the papers presented at three of those
sessions – history, testimonial statements, and statements in
domestic violence and child abuse prosecutions – and essays by
a number of the commentators at each session. 55
Historical Background
In the article that opens this symposium, “Does
Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation
Doctrine?,” University of Nebraska Professor Roger Kirst
begins with a thorough review of the evolution of confrontation
doctrine in Supreme Court decisions. 56 He next examines the
opinions in Crawford, with special focus on historical sources,
especially the constitutional debates at state ratifying
conventions. 57 Importantly, with respect to the ratification
history, he explains why that record demonstrates that no
specific rules of confrontation were intended by the drafters. 58
Rather, he concludes that history indicates an intent to leave
confrontation procedure to judicial development. 59 Professor
Kirst also offers support for his view that the Confrontation
Clause is not an incorporation of, or even an implicit reference
to, the English evidentiary common law of hearsay. 60
Based on his analysis, Professor Kirst concludes that
Justice Scalia was certainly correct that the Confrontation
Clause was designed to provide criminal defendants with a
right to cross-examine some hearsay declarants in order to
provide the trier of fact with an adequate basis to evaluate the

incrimination. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 447-50 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). It remains to be seen whether subsequent Supreme Court decisions
defining testimonial statements will continue to be limited to those derived from
modern day practices most closely akin to the civil law mode of ex parte examination
procedures at which the Confrontation Clause is directed.
55
The fourth session centered around a robust discussion of an extensive
hypothetical, raising many of the open issues. Included in the hypothetical was a
simulated, life-like recording of a telephone call to 911. Editing the transcript of the
panel discussion raised insurmountable problems. Consequently, it was decided not to
publish the hypothetical or the discussion. The simulated 911 call and a transcript of it
can be found at www.brooklaw.edu/news/homepage_news/crawford2005.php#video
(follow “Part IV: Real Hypotheticals” hyperlink).
56
Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 40-64 (2005).
57
See id. at 64-71, 77-83.
58
See id. at 77-83.
59
See id. at 82-83.
60
See id. at 83-84.
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truth and accuracy of the out-of-court statement. 61 On the
other hand, Professor Kirst doubts that the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause was to exclude certain kinds of hearsay, 62
and he argues that it was surely not designed to draw a
distinction
between
testimonial
and
nontestimonial
63
statements.
Professor Kirst then gives reasons and lays a foundation
for fine-tuning the testimonial framework. 64 Specifically, when
the Court addresses with more particularity the distinction
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, Professor
Kirst recommends that the concept of testimonial should focus
on whether admitting the particular hearsay statement, absent
cross-examination of the declarant, is consistent with the
purposes of confrontation – that is, to provide the defendant
with an ability to contest the statement, and thereby to provide
the fact-finder with a sufficient basis for evaluating the
accuracy and truthfulness of the statement. 65
At the February 2005 “Crawford and Beyond”
Conference, University of Tennessee Law School Professor Tom
Davies provided only the introduction to his prospective article.
That introduction promised a thorough exploration of English
common law, of the early American experience, and of the
difficulty of evaluating today’s world of evidentiary hearsay
and constitutional confrontation principles by exclusive
reference to and guidance by 400 years of history and doctrine.
That promise is more than fulfilled in his lead article,
“What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington.” 66 Professor
Davies argues persuasively that the testimonial/nontestimonial
dichotomy drawn in Crawford was neither part of the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, nor the English common
law, nor even pre-ratification American law. 67
Moreover, as analyzed by Professor Davies, the English
common law cases and authorities relied upon by Justice Scalia
to support a common law right of confrontation and cross-

61

See id. at 99-100.
See id.
63
See id. at 86-87.
64
See id. at 88-91.
65
See id. at 99-100.
66
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
67
See id. at 107, 119.
62
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examination simply fail to do so. Indeed, given the publication
date of at least three of those cases, Professor Davies argues
that they were irrelevant to the original American
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 68 He also explains
why the authorities relied on by the Crawford majority fail to
establish that a rigid rule of cross-examination regarding
hearsay statements was part of the American understanding of
the common law confrontation right before or during
ratification of the Bill of Rights. 69 In this regard, Professor
Davies’ use of Justice of the Peace manuals and treatises
available in the colonies is particularly illuminating. 70
More fundamentally, Professor Davies explains why he
thinks that judicial-chambers historical research is an
inherently flawed process that usually leads to inaccurate
history. 71 He points out that it is only natural to examine
history to support a conclusion already reached, instead of
examining history and then, if possible, reaching a conclusion
of how the modern doctrine can most accurately reflect the
past. 72 Perhaps more importantly, even if one could correctly
divine history, Professor Davies argues that framing-era
doctrine is usually so far removed in time, place and context
from the modern era that it cannot be applied to legal concepts
as they are presently understood, or for that matter to
contemporary practices. 73 As a result, reasoning relying only
68

See id. at 116-18.
See id. at 118-19.
70
See id. at 118.
71
See id. at 119-20. But cf. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (Or To
It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587, 1588 (1997) (“Skepticism about the limits of judicial
reasoning does not require a blanket dismissal of the possibility that historically
grounded approaches to originalism might indeed yield fruitful results.”).
72
See Davies, supra note 66, at 120 n.43. But see ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 45-46 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1997) (“[T]he difficulties and uncertainties of determining original meaning and
applying it to modern circumstances are negligible compared with the difficulties and
uncertainties of the philosophy which says that the Constitution changes . . . . The
originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many of them. The Confrontation
Clause for example, requires confrontation.”) (emphasis in original).
73
Davies, supra note 66, at 119-20. But see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6-7 (A. A. Knopf
1996) (“[W]hat is most remarkable about our knowledge of the adoption of the
Constitution is not how little we understand but how much . . . . However
indeterminate some of our findings may be, however much more evidence we could
always use, the origins of the Constitution are not ‘buried in silence or veiled in fable.’”
There are many sources that document the daily deliberations at the Constitutional
Convention as well as the subsequent ratification debates, all of which reveal the
meanings first attached to the Constitution. Additionally, the “larger intellectual
world” within which the Constitution is often located is not completely foreign to most
69
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upon framing-era doctrine and history cannot provide a
definitive answer to a contemporary question. 74
In his essay, “The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of
Crawford v. Washington,” New York Law School Professor
Randolph Jonakait explores what he sees as a fatal flaw in
Crawford’s
conclusion
that
the
Sixth
Amendment
Confrontation Clause constitutionalized English common law. 75
To demonstrate the point, Professor Jonakait highlights other
clauses of that very same Amendment, namely the rights of
defendant to the assistance of counsel, to notice of the charges,
and to compulsory process, that were undoubtedly in
derogation of the English common law. 76 Given that these
other Sixth Amendment rights do not constitutionalize the
common law, to Professor Jonakait it is incongruous to
conclude, especially without any support in the text or in the
record of ratification, that the Framers sought to codify an
English common law of confrontation.
Indeed, Professor
77
Jonakait, as has Professor Kirst, points to the text of the
Seventh Amendment to illustrate that when the drafters
sought to continue adherence to the common law, they did so
expressly. 78
To be sure, as Professor Jonakait acknowledges, the
Sixth Amendment jury trial provision is adopted from English
law. 79 Still, and with considerable force, Professor Jonakait
argues that the methods for conducting those trials were not
derived from the English common law, but instead were
essentially American in character. 80 Additionally, Professor
scholars.); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment
on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1447 (1997)
(“Our Constitution is written in English and was ratified by people who read Aristotle
and Plato; Shakespeare and Milton; Aquinas and Augustine; Hobbes and Hume; Locke
and Monstequieu; Voltaire and Rousseau; Jefferson and Madison; the Old and New
Testaments of the Bible; Dante and Homer. Americans think the 200 years from the
Republic of Slavery to the Democracy of today is an eon . . . . The American legal
tradition is just not that old nor can the Constitution be fairly compared to some
ancient manuscript written in Greek or Sanskrit.”).
74
Davies, supra note 66, at 121-22.
75
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford
v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005).
76
See id. at 220-24.
77
Kirst, supra note 56, at 84.
78
Jonakait, supra note 75, at 231.
79
See id. at 225-26.
80
See id. at 226; see also 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, at 347 (“The
American history [of confrontation] is not a continuation of the story in England but a
separate story that has significant overlap and interconnection with events in
England.”).
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Jonakait argues that by assuming a common law basis for the
confrontation right, the reasoning of Crawford serves only to
cast doubt on other longstanding Sixth Amendment principles
– for example, an indigent criminal defendant’s right to
assigned counsel. 81
Finally, with respect to history, Cardozo Law School
Professor Peter Tillers provides a brief, amusing, thoughtful
essay, “Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of
History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause.” 82 A self-confessed non-historian, Professor Tillers
finds both Professors Kirst and Davies persuasive regarding
the inaccurate history in Crawford that they argue
misinformed the Crawford decision. 83 He concludes that the
historical mistakes and distortions in Crawford occurred
because the Court knows neither how to conduct an effective
historical inquiry, nor how to use the facts disclosed by such an
inquiry. 84 Still, he warns that Crawford’s mistakes about legal
history do not necessarily mean that Crawford is an
unwelcome decision. That, he says, depends on how the text of
Crawford is read and its implications are interpreted. 85
When addressing the meaning of testimonial
statements, 86 Mark Dwyer, who has been the Chief of Appeals
in the New York County District Attorney’s Office for the past
twenty years, cautions that despite the fascinating nature of
the debate over history, practicing attorneys must rely on
controlling precedent. Mr. Dwyer advises that prosecutors and
defense counsel cannot simply walk into the courtroom and tell
the judge, “Sure there is Crawford v. Washington, but Justice
Scalia got the history wrong, and so here is how you should let
me try my case.” 87 Mr. Dwyer observes that when the Court
decides a major case like Crawford, “everything past is
essentially irrelevant” and analysis has to start with

81

Jonakait, supra note 75, at 232-34.
Peter Tillers, Legal History for a Dummy: A Comment on the Role of
History in Judicial Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 235
(2005).
83
See id. at 237.
84
See id. at 238.
85
See id. at 237 n.12.
86
See Mark Dwyer, Crawford’s “Testimonial Hearsay” Category: A Plain
Limit on the Protections of the Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (2005),
discussed more fully at text accompanying note 108, infra.
87
Id. at 275.
82
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Crawford. 88 Nonetheless, history should continue to play a role
in determining the kinds of statements that are at the
testimonial core of Crawford and its view of confrontation.
The Meaning of Testimonial
University of Michigan Law Professor Richard
Friedman explores the category of testimonial statements in
his lead article, “Grappling with the Meaning of
‘Testimonial.’” 89 After a careful and thoughtful analysis, he
favors an objective approach, focusing on whether a reasonable
declarant would have understood at the time he or she made
the statement that there was a significant probability that the
statement would be used by the prosecution. 90 In his view,
whether a statement is testimonial depends on whether it
performs the function of testimony, not whether the statement
fits within a predetermined list of characteristics. 91
Consequently, the formal nature of the statement, the
participation of a governmental agent or government abuse in
securing it, the presence of interrogation, and the presence of
excitement surrounding the statement are not essential to
finding a statement testimonial. 92 Rather, by way of emphasis,
not repetition, the controlling issue is whether the hearsay
statement performs the function of testimony.
It could well be argued that any out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of a fact asserted in that statement
always performs the function of testimony. But to Professor
Friedman, an out-of-court declarant is a witness who “bears
testimony,” within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause,
when he or she makes a statement reasonably believing that it
will be used in a criminal proceeding. 93 In his analysis,
Professor Friedman attempts to demonstrate the practical
implications of this approach.
Finally, Professor Friedman notes briefly how the
objective testimonial approach would address statements of
children.
He “tend[s] to believe” that, because of their

88

Id.
Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71
BROOK. L. REV. 241 (2005).
90
See id. at 252-54.
91
See id. at 249.
92
See id. at 243.
93
Id. at 267 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
89
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undeveloped understanding, very young children who make
out-of-court statements should not be treated as witnesses
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. 94 Assuming a
child is capable of being a “witness,” the question then becomes
whether his or her hearsay statement should be considered
testimonial. Since Professor Friedman favors an objective
standard for determining whether a declarant reasonably
believed that a statement would be used prosecutorially, he
concludes that a child’s age and immaturity would be
Yet, Professor Friedman acknowledges
irrelevant. 95
“something a little odd about asking, with respect to a
statement by a young child, what the anticipation of a
reasonable adult would be.” 96
In his essay “Testimonial Statements under Crawford:
What Makes Testimony . . . Testimonial,” 97 Brooks Holland, a
criminal defense attorney with eleven years of practice
experience in New York City and presently a Visiting Professor
of Law at Gonzaga University Law School, finds a testimonial
out-of-court statement to be one in which the surrounding
circumstances made its adjudicative use foreseeable to the
declarant. 98 To Professor Holland, objective expectation is the
key to the meaning of testimonial, not artificial notions of
94
Id. at 272. Presumably, since very young children are not “witnesses,”
their statements are not testimonial, and thus not within the categorical ban of
Crawford. See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and
Hearsay, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 243, 250 (2002).
95
Friedman, supra note 89, at 272-73. If a subjective test is used, Professor
Friedman views the proper focus to be whether “the child understood that she [or he]
was reporting wrongdoing and that some adverse consequences – including that
Mommy [presumably Daddy too] would get mad – would be visited on the wrongdoer.”
Id. at 273.
96
Id. at 273. Compare Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667-68 (2004)
(Kennedy, J.; joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.) (indicating that the
objective reasonable person standard to determine whether a suspect is in custody for
purposes of Miranda is designed to give clear guidance to the police, and that clarity
could be diminished if consideration of the suspect’s individual characteristics –
including his age – are required), with id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]here
may be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the ‘custody’ inquiry under
Miranda . . . however, [in this case] Alvarado was almost 18 at the time of this
interview.”), and id. at 673-75 (age is an objective, widely shared characteristic that
does not complicate, but is relevant to, the custody inquiry; the “‘reasonable person’
standard does not require a court to pretend that Alvarado was a 35-year-old with
aging parents whose middle-aged children do what their parent ask only out of
respect”). Cf. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, 2 All Eng. Rep. 168, 2 W.L.R. 678,
685 (House of Lords 1978) (provocation defense inter alia focuses on the degree of self
control to be expected of a reasonable person of the same age as defendant).
97
Brooks Holland, Testimonial Statements under Crawford: What Makes
Testimony . . . Testimonial?, 71 BROOK L. REV. 281 (2005).
98
See id. at 287-88.
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formality, statement context, witness cognition, interrogation
structure, status of the questioner, or governmental abuse. 99
In his essay, “Purpose as a Guide to the Interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause,” 100 University of CaliforniaHastings Professor Roger Park agrees with most of the
substance in Professor Friedman’s article. Nonetheless, he
finds it problematic, if not overly simplistic, to describe the
purpose of the confrontation guarantee as providing a criminal
defendant with the opportunity to cross-examine testimonial
hearsay defendants who must testify in the defendant’s
presence. 101
Professor Park believes it necessary to delve deeper into
why the Framers thought a right of confrontation to be
constitutionally necessary.
Citing a 1992 article by the
moderator of the program’s testimonial session, 102 Professor
Park views the “primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is
to prevent injustice caused by abuse of state power.” 103 He then
proceeds to explain his view of how the inability to confront
nontestifying hearsay declarants facilitates abuse of power by
the government.
Professor Park also views the Crawford opinion as open
to, if not embracive of, a functional approach, focusing on
whether a statement was secured by governmental
overreaching to define the scope of the confrontation right,
especially the meaning of testimonial. 104 Professor Park gives
the example of a child abuse case where he would focus on
whether a child hearsay declarant was subject to a suggestive
governmental interview, rather than focusing on the daunting,
sometimes impossible task of determining whether the child
was old enough to know that his or her statement might be
used in a criminal prosecution. Professor Park also suggests
that the government-abuse approach could provide a principled

99

See generally Holland, supra note 97.
Roger C. Park, Purpose as a Guide to the Interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 297 (2005).
101
See id. at 297-98.
102
Berger, Prosecutorial Restraint, supra note 11, at 557, 558-61.
103
Park, supra note 100, at 298.
104
See id. at 301-02; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7
(“Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward
trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse – a fact borne out time and
again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”).
100
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basis by which to conclude that casual hearsay to a private
individual passes constitutional-confrontation muster. 105
Professor Park emphasizes that particular results are
not the focus of his concern. 106 Nevertheless, simply because
the Roberts indicia of reliability framework proved
unsatisfactory to Professor Park, it does not follow that the
same fate awaits a confrontation inquiry focusing on
governmental abuse or overreaching. 107
Playing the game by the rules enunciated in Crawford,
the aforementioned Mark Dwyer 108 reads testimonial to include
only those modern day statements that truly resemble the class
of formal statements disfavored at common law.
Those
statements include affidavits, depositions and statements of
witnesses and accomplices taken by magistrates, justices of the
peace, and other officers of the crown. 109
According to Mr. Dwyer, broadening the testimonial
category to include hearsay statements not of this ilk is simply
not within the holding of Crawford. 110 He is also critical of the
attempt to redefine testimonial to include statements of a
declarant who believes that such statements will have a law
enforcement “use,” because belief about “use” is simply not
enough to make an out-of-court declarant a witness bearing
testimony. 111 Rather, he says, the focus of testimonial should
be a declarant’s expectation that his or her statement will serve
as the equivalent of in-court testimony. 112
Finally, Mr. Dwyer emphasizes that nontestimonial
statements may be inadmissible hearsay, but that does not, per
se, render such statements excludible under the Confrontation
Clause. 113 Indeed, to Mr. Dwyer, arguments seeking to broaden
the scope of testimonial well beyond the statements obtained
under the civil law ex parte mode of examination are nothing
more than a desire to recast the Confrontation Clause into a
super rule against hearsay. Mr. Dwyer expresses profound
skepticism that Crawford supports such a result. 114
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Park, supra note 100, at 298-99.
See id. at 303.
See id. at 305.
See Dwyer, supra note 86.
See id. at 277.
See id. at 277-78.
Id. at 279.
See id.
See id. at 278.
See id.
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In his essay, Paul Shechtman, a leading New York
criminal defense attorney and former New York County and
federal prosecutor, who teaches evidence at Columbia
University Law School, bemoans the demise of the Roberts
indicia of reliability framework. 115 He does so because he
believes that Roberts asked the correct question: “was the outof-court statement sufficiently reliable that it could be
admitted at criminal trial untested by cross-examination?” 116
Mr. Shechtman observes that the new Crawford standard
fosters unpredictability 117 and he expresses concern that
Crawford will weaken Confrontation Clause protections for
defendants by permitting the introduction of testimony of
dubious reliability. 118
Mr. Shechtman also describes an untoward consequence
of Crawford involving the possible unconstitutionality of
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(6). 119 That rule, in part,
authorizes a business record custodian, in lieu of testifying, to
submit an affidavit certifying that a record complies with Rule
902(11), Rule 902(12) or other statutes permitting certification.
Given that an affidavit of certification is made for the very
purpose of being introduced in evidence, it is, the argument
goes, testimonial and hence inadmissible in a criminal case,
absent the affiant’s testimony. 120 Yet, this kind of affidavit
hardly resembles the civil-law ex parte deposition at which the
right of confrontation is directed. 121 Mr. Shechtman’s concern
in this regard implicitly recognizes that requiring the certifying
affiant to testify defeats the very practical purpose of the
certification process, which is to permit record custodians to
115
Paul L. Shechtman, From “Reliability” to Uncertainty: Difficulties Inherent
in Interpreting and Applying the New Crawford Standard, 71 BROOK L. REV. 305, 307
(2005).
116
Id. at 306.
117
See id. at 308.
118
See id. at 309.
119
Mr. Shechtman points to a pre-Crawford federal district court case decided
under the indicia of reliability framework that had upheld against a confrontation
challenge the admissibility of a certification of foreign business records pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3505. See Shechtman, supra note 115, at 308-09 (citing United States v.
Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Weinstein, J.)).
120
See United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142JAR, 2005 WL 1227790 (D. Kan.
May 23, 2005) (Federal Rule of Evidence certification of business record excluded as
testimonial).
121
See State v. Cook, No. WD-04-029, 2005 WL 736671, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 31, 2005) (affidavit by custodian of documents that they are made and kept in the
ordinary course of business is not the kind of testimonial evidence about which
Crawford is concerned).
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perform the job for which they have been employed, rather
than having to become professional witnesses. 122
Testimonial Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Prosecutions
Throughout her article, “Remember the Ladies and the
Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and
Sexual Abuse Cases,” 123 Southwestern Law School Professor
Myrna Raeder is intellectually forthright in presenting her
viewpoint and the conflicting concerns and policies that have
engendered it. On the one side is her belief in the need and
desirability to assure that the voices of women and children are
heard, both to protect them and to lower the incidence of
domestic violence and sexual abuse. 124 On the other side is her
fear of eviscerating defendants’ rights to confront live witnesses
with first-hand knowledge, as opposed to second-hand
reporters of hearsay, and her corresponding view that the
category “testimonial hearsay” should be interpreted broadly. 125
Professor Raeder seems both amazed and dismayed that
the right of confrontation in 2004 is to be defined by focusing
on the world of 1791, a “world that typically treated [women
and children] as chattel” and in which domestic violence and
sexual abuse prosecutions were virtually unknown. 126 A world,
as Professor Raeder describes it, without organized police
departments, medical or forensic protocols in criminal cases,
mandatory reporting requirements for medical personnel who
have knowledge of domestic violence or child abuse, videotape,
audiotape, closed-circuit television, telephones, computers, email, typewriters, emergency 911 operators, mandatory arrest
and no-drop prosecution policies in domestic violence or child
sex abuse cases, protective orders, and expansive hearsay
exceptions. 127
With the 2004/1791 dichotomy as a backdrop, Professor
Raeder examines domestic violence and its criminalization, as
122
See Napier v. State, 827 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(“unreasonable to have a toxicologist in every court on a daily basis offering testimony
about his [or her] inspection of a breathalyzer machine and the certification of the
operator as a proper administrator of the breath test”) (citation omitted).
123
Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s
Impact on Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005).
124
See id. at 314.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See id. at 311-12, 324.
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well as the realities of domestic violence prosecutions. 128 She
also discusses current trends affecting domestic violence and
child abuse litigation.
She critiques the testimonial approach of Crawford and
presents her view on the appropriate definition of testimonial
statements, in particular excited utterances, “the workhorse of
She considers other hearsay
domestic violence cases.” 129
exceptions frequently used in such prosecutions, i.e. statements
for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, dying
declarations, prior inconsistent statements of testifying
victims, ad hoc exceptions, as well as forfeiture. 130 Professor
Raeder then discusses some of these issues as they arise in
child abuse prosecutions. 131
She also explores waiver by a defendant “opening the
132
door” to testimonial statements, the expansion of admissible
hearsay for declarants who testify, and embraces “evidentiary
creativity” 133 with respect to new post-Crawford hearsay
exceptions in domestic violence cases, and expert testimony to
provide needed background information about domestic battery
and child abuse. 134
Finally, and “more globally,” Professor Raeder proposes
restructuring domestic violence prosecutions into three distinct
tracks in order to allocate the scarce judicial resources to the
prosecution of the most dangerous offenders. 135
In his essay, “Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay
Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse
Cases,” 136 Duke University Law Professor Robert Mosteller
acknowledges that, regardless of the ultimate definitional
breadth of “testimonial,” Crawford will substantially limit the
admissibility of hearsay in domestic violence cases and have a
somewhat lesser, but nonetheless significant, impact on the
admissibility of hearsay in child abuse cases. 137 The breadth of
testimonial notwithstanding, Professor Mosteller explores
128

See id. at 326-32.
Raeder supra note 123, at 332.
130
See id. at 348-66.
131
See id. at 374-89.
132
Id. at 359.
133
Id. at 315.
134
See id. at 366-67, 370-371.
135
Id. at 315, 367.
136
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic
Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 411 (2005).
137
Id. at 411-12.
129
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available tools, or tools that could be made available, that will
assist the successful prosecution of domestic violence and child
abuse cases. 138
He also suggests that in child sexual abuse cases better,
harder, and more creative work by prosecutors in preparing a
child witness to testify will well-serve successful
prosecutions. 139 Given that the Crawford majority leaves no
doubt that if the declarant testifies, then there is no
confrontation bar to the introduction of his or her prior hearsay
statements, 140 Professor Mosteller points approvingly to an
Oregon statute that provides for the admissibility of all prior
statements by a child sexual abuse victim in a sex crime
prosecution, provided the child testifies and is subject to crossexamination. 141 Of course, absent such a statute, he recognizes
that the traditional rule against hearsay will prove
troublesome for the introduction of many of the statements
that would be admissible only under an Oregon-type
provision. 142
Professor Mosteller advocates that domestic violence
victims testify at an early adversary proceeding hearing such
as a preliminary hearing, a conditional examination to
preserve testimony, or other deposition, provided that the
defendant has an opportunity and real motive to cross-examine
the victim, as well as other restrictions. 143 Additionally, he also
provides sound reasoning to support the conclusion that the
confrontation right is not satisfied simply by producing the
declarant either at a pretrial hearing or at trial to be called by
the defendant. 144
Professor Mosteller agrees that if the restrictions he
suggests are adhered to, then, regardless of whether the victim
is subsequently unavailable to testify or is called by the
prosecution to testify, the introduction of the prior hearing
138

See id. at 412-13.
Id. at 414-15.
140
Id. at 414.
141
Id. at 415 (citing OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b) (OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(18a)(b)
(2005))). More problematic is another Oregon law, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(26a) (2005),
Rule 803(26a). That statute provides for the admissibility of any domestic violence
accusation made within 24 hours of the event and either recorded electronically or in
writing, or made to a peace officer, other corrections officer, youth corrections officer,
parole officer, probation officer, emergency medical technician, or firefighter. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004); see also supra note 25.
142
Mosteller, supra note 136, at 420-21.
143
See id. at 415-16.
144
See id. at 416-17.
139
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testimony would not violate the confrontation right. This is so
even if, as Professor Mosteller postulates, the victim at trial
exonerates the defendant, refuses to implicate the defendant,
or denies making or the truth of the prior statement. 145
Finally, Professor Mosteller voices concern that once
prior confronted testimony of a victim has been secured, the
prosecution may have less of an incentive to procure the trial
testimony of the victim. 146 He believes, however, that this
concern can be addressed by judicial vigilance to ensure that
the witness is indeed unavailable, and that the prosecution
worked “roughly as hard to find and produce the witness as it
does in cases where the witness is needed to prove the
prosecution’s case.” 147
In his essay, “Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation
Clause,” 148 Professor Tom Lininger of the University of Oregon
School of Law does not share Professor Raeder’s uneasiness
over a historical testimonial approach to the Confrontation
Rather, Professor Lininger concludes that the
Clause. 149
“testimonial approach is more faithful to the Framers’ intent
[and] concerns” 150 about confrontation than the vague Roberts
indicia of reliability framework.
As for excited utterances that often mark domestic
violence cases, Professor Lininger agrees with Professor Raeder
that a categorical approach is too drastic. 151 This is true
regardless of whether excited hearsay utterances are routinely
treated as testimonial or nontestimonial. 152 In particular, with
respect to automatic nontestimonial status for excited
utterances, Professor Lininger directs attention to a footnote in
Crawford, in which the Court strongly implies an inclination to
include within the police-interrogation testimonial subcategory
some modern day noncustodial spontaneous (excited)
utterances of child sex abuse victims. 153
145

See id. at 417-19.
See id. at 425-26.
147
Id. at 426 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 79-80 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
148
Tom Lininger, Yes, Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 401 (2005).
149
Id. at 402.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 404.
152
See id. at 403-04.
153
See id. at 404 n.15 (citing 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004)); see also supra note
25.
146
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Instead of a per se approach, Professor Lininger
acknowledges that excited utterances could be subject to a
case-by-case consideration of factors that serve to distinguish
testimonial from nontestimonial statements.
He fears,
however, the unpredictable and easily manipulable nature of
such an ad hoc approach, which he finds far too reminiscent of
the Roberts indicia of reliability standard repudiated by
Crawford. 154
Professor Lininger offers another approach, which
would treat all statements to police officers as presumptively
testimonial, provided that the declarant believes that she or he
was speaking to the police. 155 Under Professor Lininger’s view,
the prosecution could rebut the presumption with a “strong
154

See Lininger, supra note 148, at 405.
Id. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 552
(Mass. 2005) (“[S]tatements made in response to questioning by law enforcement
agents, e.g. concerning physical abuse by boyfriend, are per se testimonial except when
the questioning is meant to secure a volatile scene or to establish the need for or
provide medical care.”), and United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 901, 903-04 (6th
Cir. 2005) (Even though a statement of a woman who had been menaced by a man with
a gun was within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule it was excluded
because a ‘“statement made knowingly to the authorities that describes criminal
activity is almost always testimonial’” and “the decisive inquiry should be ‘whether a
reasonable person in the declarant’s position would anticipate his [or her] statement
being used against the accused in investigating or prosecuting the crime,’” (quoting
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004))), and State v. Moody, 594
S.E.2d 350, 353 n.6 (Ga. 2004) (holding testimonial a murder victim’s statements to
police officers conducting field investigation shortly after defendant had fired his
shotgun into her bedroom), with Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456-58 (Ind. 2005)
(Excited utterance responses, e.g. of an abused spouse, to initial inquiries at a crime
scene are typically not testimonial; the standard for testimonial focuses on the
subjective intent, i.e. motivation, of the declarant and the questioner “more than that of
the declarant”; and when a statement is taken pursuant to established procedures the
subjective motivation of the questioner or the objectively-evaluated purpose of the
procedure controls. An affidavit signed at the scene by the victim-wife is, however
testimonial.), cert. granted, No. 05-5705 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf at 3. See also State
v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750, 775 (Conn. 2005) (“where a [shooting] victim contacts a police
officer immediately following a criminal incident to report a possible injury and the
officer receives information or asks questions to ensure that the victim receives proper
medical attention and the crime scene is properly secured, the victim’s statements
describing the crime are not testimonial,” but part and parcel of the crime itself. In
these situations, “an objective witness reasonably would not believe that the
statements would be available for use at a later trial.” (citation omitted)). Statements
made during 911 emergency calls have been addressed on a case-by-case basis, focusing
on whether the call is a truly spontaneous, excited plea for help, contemporaneous with
or immediately after the danger has presented itself, or simply a narrative of past
events. See, e.g., Arnold, 410 F.3d at 900-01; United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355,
361-62 (3d Cir. 2005); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 2005); People v.
Coleman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash.
2005), cert. granted, No. 05-5225 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf at 3.
155
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showing” that the nontestimonial characteristics outweigh the
testimonial characteristics. 156
Professor Lininger shares Professor Raeder’s belief that
one of Crawford’s “greatest shortcomings” is its failure to
address specifically whether confrontation or due process
requirements limit the admissibility of nontestimonial
statements of declarants who do not testify. 157 A number of
courts have used the Crawford-savaged Roberts reliability
framework with respect to nontestimonial statements that are
As an
not at the core of the Confrontation Clause. 158
alternative, Professor Lininger finds attractive the Oregon
Supreme Court’s state constitutional approach to the Roberts
indicia of reliability framework, requiring the prosecution to
establish the unavailability of the declarant or to produce the
declarant as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a hearsay
statement. 159 This Oregon approach is virtually identical to
language in Roberts, which ironically, was also subsequently
rejected by the pre-Crawford Supreme Court, that time
because the unavailability approach was overly protective of
the confrontation right. 160
In conclusion, Professor Lininger advocates, as does
Professor Mosteller, 161 that prosecutors direct their attention to
156

Lininger, supra note 148, at 405.
Id. at 405; Raeder, supra note 123, at 316-17.
158
Courts use the indicia of reliability framework because that portion of
Roberts has not yet been set aside with respect to nontestimonial hearsay statements.
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Given that firmly-rooted hearsay
exceptions are conclusively deemed reliable under the indicia of reliability framework
of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 74 (1980), most nontestimonial statements will be
admissible except those that do not fit within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception and do
not have particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Compare, e.g., United States v.
Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2004) (nontestimonial, non-custodial declaration
against penal interest of a co-conspirator to a private party bore particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness), Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2004)
(accomplice statements within the “firmly rooted” hearsay exception for state of mind
declaration are clothed by indicia of reliability), and State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811,
814-28 (Wis. 2005) (declarant’s private conversation with his girlfriend describing a
shooting, as well as the defendant’s participation in it, shortly after the incident took
place, is not testimonial, even though the statement came within a state hearsay
exception for statements of recent perception, that exception is not firmly rooted;
nonetheless, the statement bears sufficient particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness to satisfy the Roberts indicia of reliability requirement), with Miller v.
State, 98 P.3d 738, 744-48 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (accomplice’s confession to a private
person is nontestimonial but there are no particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness).
159
Lininger, supra note 148, at 406; see State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 788-91
(Or. 2002); accord State v. McGriff, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (Haw. 1994).
160
See supra note 3.
161
Mosteller, supra note 136, at 411, 414-16.
157
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facilitating the confrontation required by Crawford, rather
than disputing the need for it. 162
Our last essayist, Laurence Busching, was the attorneyin-charge of domestic violence and child abuse prosecutions
brought by the New York County District Attorney’s Office for
four years. 163 He opens by discussing the reasons for the
practical and evidentiary strategies employed by the
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office in its pre-Crawford
efforts to prosecute successfully extremely difficult domestic
abuse and child abuse cases. 164
According to Mr. Busching, the post-Crawford
predictions of serious and disastrous difficulties in so-called
“evidence-based” 165 prosecutions, i.e., without the victim’s incourt testimony, have not yet come to pass in New York. 166
These difficulties have not occurred because New York courts
have often characterized hearsay statements in domestic
violence and child abuse cases as excited utterances, present
sense impressions, and statements to medical doctors for
purposes of diagnosis and treatment. Because declarants
usually make such statements informally and without
awareness of prosecutorial use, these statements are not
testimonial. 167 However, Mr. Busching acknowledges that some
convictions have been rendered more difficult because other
kinds of victim hearsay statements have been held to be
testimonial. 168
In the aftermath of Crawford, Mr. Busching notes that
prosecutorial self-examination has prompted the contemplation
of new strategies, including increased attention to the recovery
of physical evidence and to the memorialization of the injuries
suffered by the victim. 169 Statements from the suspect-abusers
162

Lininger, supra note 148, at 408-09.
See Laurence Busching, Rethinking Strategies for Prosecution of Domestic
Violence in the Wake of Crawford, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 391 (2005).
164
See id. at 393-95.
165
Some prosecutors are unhappy with this characterization because all
prosecutions are evidence-based, regardless of who does or does not testify. See
Andrew Seewald, Evidence-Based Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases After
Crawford v. Washington: A Greatly Exaggerated Death, EMPIRE STATE PROSECUTOR,
Spring 2005, at 28.
166
Busching, supra note 163, at 396; accord Seewald, supra note 165, at 29.
But see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 820
app. 1 (2005) (California, Oregon and Washington reported a post-Crawford increase in
dismissals of domestic violence cases).
167
Busching, supra note 163, at 397.
168
See id.
169
See id.
163
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themselves, obtained after full Miranda warnings, are another
important source of evidence; such statements were not always
sought from defendants in the pre-Crawford era. 170 Also,
prosecutors had started to use imaginatively the forfeiture
doctrine even before Crawford. That might now be especially
important in domestic violence cases, when the unavailability
of the declarant is the direct result of conduct by or
attributable to the defendant. 171
Mr. Busching also thinks that Crawford may prompt
prosecutors to reconsider whether to compel domestic violence
victims to testify. He further believes that, in order to protect
against the risk of recantations on the stand by understandably
frightened victims, it may be necessary to explore amending
New York’s strict statutory evidentiary limitation on the kinds
of statements that a party (usually the prosecution) may use to
impeach its own witness. 172
Finally, given Crawford’s holding that there is no bar to
the testimonial hearsay of a declarant who testifies at trial, Mr.
Busching
ruminates
about
whether
it
would
be
confrontationally sufficient simply to produce the declarant or
otherwise make him or her available to be called for crossexamination by the defendant. 173
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See id. at 397-98.
See id. at 398. See, e.g., People v. Santiago, No. 2725-02, 2003 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 829, *1-2, *51-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (defendant’s pattern of abusing his wife
over a period of many years had clearly, convincingly and intentionally assured her
unavailability, even before the charged crimes of contempt and violations of orders of
protection had been committed).
172
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.35 (A witness called by a party in a
criminal case, who elicits from that witness testimony upon a material issue, tending to
disprove the calling party’s position, may be impeached by the calling party through
the introduction of a prior written statement signed by the witness, or by the witness’s
oral statement under oath contradicting the witness’s trial testimony. The statute
expressly provides that the prior statements are not admissible for substantive proof.
When the witness’s testimony does not tend to disprove the calling and eliciting party’s
case, the prior statements are not admissible but can be used to refresh the witness’s
recollection, provided that the contents of the statement are not disclosed to the jury.).
173
Busching, supra note 163, at 400; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
60 n.9 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements . . . . The Clause does not bar admission of a statement as long as the
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”). In his symposium essay,
Professor Mosteller offers a reasoned conclusion that the confrontation right is not
satisfied by the prosecutor simply producing or otherwise making the victim available
to be called by defendants. See Mosteller, supra note 136, at 416-17; see also State v.
Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 332-33 (Md. 2005).
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FINAL THOUGHTS
Before Crawford, the Supreme Court last addressed a
Confrontation Clause hearsay issue in the 1999 case Lilly v.
Virginia. 174 There, the Court unanimously reversed a Virginia
Supreme Court that had rejected a confrontation challenge to
the admission of a nontestifying accomplice’s custodial
confession to the police. The rationale for reversal was
supported only by a plurality opinion, 175 which was
accompanied by four other separate concurring opinions. 176
Remarkably, only five years later, a seven justice
majority in Crawford spoke with one voice, that of Justice
Scalia. By examining the text of the Confrontation Clause,
particularly the word witnesses, English history and common
law (perhaps too much), pre-ratification American history
(perhaps not enough), the practices that most concerned the
Framers, the articulation of that concern during the
ratification process and the modern day equivalent of those
practices, Justice Scalia paints a simple but persuasive portrait
of the majority’s vision of the confrontation right and its
relationship to hearsay. That vision is well-captured and
persuasive regardless of the name given to the interpretative
approach followed.
Though hardly necessary to its holding, the Crawford
majority at times seems to play a little too fast and loose with
English common law to tell a story that comports fully with its
view of the limitations placed on the introduction of hearsay by
the Confrontation Clause. Nevertheless, much to its credit, the
Crawford majority focuses on statements secured by law
enforcement interrogation of individuals who respond with
testimony-bearing statements.
The introduction of such
statements at trial and the defendant’s inability to crossexamine the absent declarant are a core concern of the
Confrontation Clause. Thus, centering analysis on practices
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Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
See id. at 120, 134, 137-38 (Stevens, J., for plurality; joined by Souter,
Ginsburg & Breyer, J.J.) (custodial statements of a nontestifying accomplice that
petitioner committed the charged murder were neither within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, nor possessed of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness).
176
Id. at 140 (Breyer, J. concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J. concurring in part
and in the judgment); id. at 143; (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment);
id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment; joined by O’Connor & Kennedy,
J.J.).
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that are modern-day counterparts to the abuses targeted by the
Clause is particularly appropriate.
The
wisdom
of
the
testimonial
approach
notwithstanding, every question or group of questions does not
necessarily constitute an interrogation, nor is every answer to
a question necessarily a testimonial statement. This caveat
aside, the categorical exclusion of testimonial statements
absent cross-examination of the declarant surely should prove
a more principled, and less subjective approach than, and
without the “unpardonable vice” of, the Roberts indicia of
reliability framework.
The twenty months since Crawford have seen untold
numbers of reported and unreported state and federal cases
struggling over the meaning of “testimonial.” Indeed, some
observers may have started to wonder whether “testimonial”
will turn out to be as vague and malleable as the Roberts
“reliability” framework. The difficulty with the testimonial
concept had been presaged at oral argument in Crawford.
While exploring the definitional scope of “testimonial” with
Crawford’s counsel, Justice O’Connor rhetorically remarked,
“[W]hy buy a pig in a poke.” 177 Whatever the Court has bought
or wrought will be on display as it considers and decides two
state Crawford cases in which certiorari was granted on
October 31, 2005. 178
The articles and essays that follow are scholarly,
enlightening, thoughtful, thought-provoking, and even
amusing. They provide a well-rounded read by which to
explore the meaning and scope of the many issues presented by
Crawford, and a perfect introduction to whatever comes next.
After the “Crawford and Beyond” Conference, this
wonderful Symposium Issue of the Law Review, and the two
cases in which a decision can be expected by the end of the
2005 term, we can look forward to “Crawford and Beyond:
Revisited.”
177

Transcript of Oral Argument, 2003 WL 22705281, at *14, Crawford, 541
U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410).
178
See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (a hysterical, crying
declarant’s description of how and by whom she had just been assaulted given to a 911
operator is not testimonial), cert. granted, No. 05-5224 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf at 3; Hammon v.
State, 829 N.E. 2d 444 (Ind. 2005) (a “somewhat frightened” woman’s description of
physical abuse by her husband made to police officers responding to a reported
domestic disturbance is not testimonial), cert. granted, No. 05-5705 (U.S. Oct. 31,
2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/103105pzor.pdf
at 3.

